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Abstract 
 
This research studies the effects on income and employment when externally imposed 
policies constrain use of common forest resources. Using a mixed-integer linear programming 
model, the study examines the impacts of cons ervation-oriented community forest policies in 
Nepal on three household income groups. The results show that current community forest 
policies, which direct forest use towards environment conservation and timber production, 
cause large reductions in employment and income of the poorest households and largely 
explain the recent increase in rural poverty. 
 
JEL Classification: C6, D3, D6, I3, O2 and Q0 
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Introduction 
 
In physical and institutional terms, land is a limiting factor for primary production in Nepal. 
Forestland, including shrub-land and alpine pasture, comprises 39 percent of the total land 
area in Nepal, and arable land covers 21 percent. The rest of the land provides little scope for 
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economic use. In the 2002 agricultural census, the average land holding was less than 0.8 
hectares per household and 74.1 percent of land-owning households had less than one hectare 
of land. The bottom 47 percent of land-owning households had an average land area of 0.5 
hectares (CBS, 2003). Despite being an agriculture-based economy, 29 percent of farming 
households are landless (UNDP, 2005), and more than 60 percent of the land-owning 
households in Nepal have a food deficit from their own land (CBS, 2003).  
 
Historically, mountain communities managed pastures and forests together in common. 
Households with marginal landholdings had easy access to community resources to 
complement their private resources and to sustain their livelihoods. When the Government 
introduced the Private Forestry Nationalization Act (1957), it abolished the traditional 
regulation systems of common forestlands. This was followed by substantial deforestation, 
which the government and international agencies believed caused landslides in Nepal and 
flooding in Bangladesh (Ives and Messerli, 1989). Livestock farming and firewood use by  hill 
farmers were believed to be the main factors causing deforestation (Ives and Messerli, 1989; 
Master Plan, 1988).  
 
With the realisation of the importance of users’ involvement in making forest conservation 
effective, the government prepared the Forest ry Sector Master Plan (1988) (hereafter “The 
Plan”). The Plan provided guidelines for participatory community forestry implementation, 
and a local user group-based community forestry policy was introduced in the late 1980s. The 
objectives for the policy were, “[T]o meet people’s needs” for forestry products, “[T]o 
support other sectors… in meeting people’s basic needs” and “[T]o conserve and maintain 
safe and wholesome natural environment” (Master Plan 1988: pp 68-69).  
 
  4 
Community forestry policies have achieved their goals in terms of the number of forest user 
groups and in improving forest cover. Over 14,000 forestry users groups were formed in the 
first 12 years of the community forestry program (CFUG Database 2005). Deforestation has 
been halted and high forest stocks are being restored (Gautam et al., 2002), in some cases to 
the extent that forests are over-stocked (Nurse et. al. 2004). Wildlife populations have 
increased and the government is being urged to introduce wildlife control policies 
(Community Forestry Division 2004). Some communities have also been able to generate 
funds from sales of forest products from community forests (Dongol et. al. 2002).  
 
Despite these successes, a number of studies have shown that there are negative distributional 
outcomes under community forestry policies, with poor households receiving less benefit 
from community forests than wealthier households (Dhakal et al., 2005; Agrawal, 2001; 
Adhikari et al., 2004). Generally, the regressive outcomes from community forestry are 
largely attributed to problems in decision-making at the community level (Pokharel and 
Nurse, 2004). However, the focus of reforestation activities, forest laws and institutional 
changes were on increasing forest cover and limiting access for livestock or firewood (Master 
Plan, 1988). For example, one of the policy strategies for reducing forest products demand, is 
“reducing and controlling livestock numbers” (Master Plan 1988 p. 148) and making 
household fodder supply “fully self sufficient” from private lands (Master Plan 1988 p. 85). 
The government also introduced compulsory forest inventories and forest harvesting to less 
than 30 percent of mean annual increment (MAI) for slow growing species and 60 percent of 
MAI for fast growing species. As a result, the negative distributional outcomes under 
community forestry could instead be attrbutable to government constraints on use of 
community forests rather than how user groups decide how to use them. 
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A key question addressed by this study is whether constraints on use of community forests 
under current community forestry policy are linked to the inability of communities to meet the 
needs of the poorest households. If there is a link, then the second question is whether there 
are alternative policies that will make it easier for communities to meet the needs of the poor. 
In this context, the issue is one of constrained income-maximization.  The following section 
outlines a model for studying the effects of household and community forest land allocation 
on income and employment under different constraints. 
 
Modeling Community Forest Based Households 
 
It is assumed that the welfare of a household depends on various outputs from its limited 
private land (ap), community forestland (ac), and household labour endowment (L). 
Community forestland use is constrained by government policy (Gv). The generalised 
decision problem of a household is then to, 
 
  Maximise y =  f ap ,  ac ,  L,  Gv( ) 
Subject to 
1
J
rj j rj
A X b
=
£å  and 0jX ³ , 
 
where y is household income, Xj is a vector of decision variables (ap, ac, L, Gv), Ar is 
constraint function with r linear constraints, j decision variable matrices, br is a constant term 
for the j decision variable matrices and X³ 0 denotes non-negativity of the decision variables. 
The specific model of community forestry used in the study is outlined below. 
 
Household Production System 
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In this model, it is assumed that a production (cropping) system can produce more than one 
product simultaneously and that marginal product is constant. Output of any good i under 
production system t on land type k is a function of yield per unit area with a production 
system on a land type (gitk) and the area of land type k allocated to a particular production 
system by a household (atk). Land can include private land, land used under sharecropping and 
common forest land. Products may be a single output from a production system or by-
products. Total output of any particular good by a household (q i) is then a function of how 
much land of various types the household allocates to different production systems.  
 
( )
n m
i itk tk
k 1 t=1
q = g a
=
×åå  
 
In a subsistence agricultural household it is impractical to separate household production from 
household consumption. In this model, only labour that is hired (Lh) and production inputs 
that are purchased (I) are accounted for as costs. Household labour requirements for a 
particular output will be either a function of labour hours required per unit area (hatk) and the 
area of land type k allocated to a particular production system t by a household (atk), or a 
function of output (q i) and harvest productivity for that good (hvi). Total household labour (L) 
required is then,  
 
( ) ( )
m n r
a v
tk tk i i
t=1 k 1 1
L= h .a h .q
i= =
+åå å  
 
The amount of hired labour (Lh) required is a function of available family labour (Lo) and the 
total household labour (L) requirement (Lh  = L – Lo).  
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Net household income (y) is the difference between revenue and cost. In addition to 
producing output, households are able to earn external income in the labour market (Lm), 
earning a wage rate (w). In practice, a household will either earn outside income (Lm) or 
employ outside labour (Lh), but will not do both. A household can also buy products (food, 
firewood, timber, fodder) in the market (qmi) at market prices (pi). Total net income for a 
household is then, 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i
r n m r
m
i i h m i
i=1 k=1 t=1 i=1
y= P q L w I L w - p q´ - ´ - + ´ ´é ùë ûååå å  
 
Community Welfare 
 
In this model the community is structured as m different income groups with n households in 
each group. Income groups  are categorised as poor (P), medium (M) and rich (R) based on 
sufficiency of household income from private landholdings to meet basic needs. In this study, 
poor households are defined as having insufficient private land to meet basic needs, medium 
households have just sufficient land, and rich households have a surplus of land to meet basic 
needs. The community forest can be managed for joint benefit and treated as another income 
group/househo ld, or it can be treated as semi-private land if rights are allocated to individuals 
to make individual decisions over a particular area. The objective is maximization of 
community income (Y) across all households in each income group, including from 
community managed forests and all products subject to constraints on area, labour 
availability, employment opportunities, the need to meet basic food, heating and housing 
needs, and a restriction against making individual households worse off to maximise 
community income.  
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Policy Scenarios  
 
The model is used to test how land and labour resources would be allocated by households to 
maximize income from their land resources under various policy scenarios by applying 
constraints, or by changing the value of parameters or cons traints. In total, seven policy 
scenarios are evaluated which represent current policy, actual forest use situations faced by 
particular communities, and alternatives that are considered to be viable (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The effect of community forestry policies are examined from two perspectives, income, and 
employment. There are two types of possible effects on income, total income available and 
distribution of income.  In terms of total income, it is hypothesized that the total income of the 
community with policy constraints will be lower than in unconstrained cases. In terms of 
income distribution, it is hypothesized that any reduction in income will be greatest for poor 
households, less for medium income households, and least for rich households, and that this 
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would cause income disparity to increase.  In addition, a household needs minimum amounts 
of some goods for survival. The hypothesis is that the ability to meet these needs will be 
adequate for each household in the unconstrained cases, and lower and perhaps insufficient in 
constrained cases. There are two types of effects on employment. Total employment under 
constraints imposed by government policies is expected to be lower than an unconstrained 
situation. Any reduction in employment with constraints is also expected to be borne more by 
poor households than by medium or rich households.  
 
Data 
 
Data for the model was collected using household surveys, user group su rveys and secondary 
sources. For the study, six community forest user groups in three districts (Dolakha, Kavre 
and Nuwakot) of the mid-hill region of Nepal were selected on the basis of representative 
forest condition, type of forage-gathering practices, age of the user group, forest size and level 
of access to district forest office services. For the household surveys, a semi-structured 
questionnaire was administered to female heads of 259 farming households in May-July, 
2003. The respondents were asked a range of questions including their size of land holding of 
all types of private lands including share cropping, their level of food sufficiency, family size, 
household labour, livestock holdings, and firewood and timber collection from community 
forests. The information common to all households were collected from local market surveys, 
key informants, and secondary sources. For the policy modelling, a proforma community was 
derived from an average of the six survey groups for private landholding size, consumer units, 
and labour supply.  
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Results 
 
The effects of different policy scenarios on total community and householde income are 
presented in Figure 1. As expected, total community and household incomes decrease as more 
restrictive forest policies are imposed. The changes are largest for poor and  medium income 
households but generally very small (one percent) for rich households.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The Family Basic Need line in Figure 1 shows the officially-defined, bare survival income 
needed for minimum calories and other basic non-food items, estimated to be Rs 33,626 for 
2003 based on  2001 prices inflated at 5 percent (NPC 2003). The Survival Needs line is the 
income required to meet essential food (calories), firewood and timber requirements as 
estimated from the model. In the Base and the Lease scenarios, all households have more than 
sufficient to meet these minimum amounts. In the Full MAI and Firewood scenarios the 
income barely meets the minimum need of the poor household. In the Current Policy, the No 
Log Market and the Zero Income scenarios income is insufficient to meet the needs for the 
poor household.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the income share across the households in the community with different 
policy scenarios. Income inequality increases as forest policy constraints are imposed, and the 
impact is greatest on poor households. The lowest income inequality is found in the 
Leasehold policy scenario.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
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The analysis shows that income across households are associated with restrictions on land 
uses. Community forestry policy effects are greatest for poor households who have far smaller 
landholdings to produce food and other income. The policies have less effect on rich and 
medium income households who have larger private landholdings. Resource supply from the 
community forest is essential to sustain the livelihood of the poor households. However forest 
policy constrains community land uses and employment opportunities. For all households, the 
highest income was in the Leasing scenario. The Leasing scenario created greater land use 
flexibility and employment, and increased total income.   
 
Figure 3 shows comparative results for total community and household unemployment under 
different policy scenarios. The employment is provided from within the community and does 
not include employment from outside the community. In the Base case and the Lease case 
scenario there is a net demand for labour from outside the community. In all other scenarios 
there is net unemployment that increases with policy restrictions. The unemployment is also 
more pronounced for poor households, while rich households hired some labour in most 
cases.  
 
Figure 3 about here  
 
The results show that community forestry policy constraints have a big influence on 
household employment opportunities. The level of employment is directly related to the land 
type. In the Base case, the rich household us es its private land mostly for firewood 
production. In the Current Policy scenario the land was distributed almost equally for timber 
and firewood production. Firewood production on private land saved household labour for the 
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rich household. Similarly, the number of unemployed peo ple is less in the Current Policy 
scenario than for the Zero Log market scenario. The reason is that many labour days were 
engaged in labour intensive firewood collection. Therefore, the income of poor households is 
greater in the Current Policy scenario than in the Zero Log market scenario.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The research shows that Nepal’s current community forest po licies could have contributed to 
much of the existing rural poverty and unemployment through limitations on use of 
community forests. Current community forest policies emphasise environmental conservation 
as their primary goal. This in turn constrains income and employment opportunities for poor 
households. Supplies of raw materials from common land are essential to fulfil the basic 
needs of the poorest households in rural areas where private land and other employment 
opportunities are limited. The policies have also increased income disparities between low 
income and high income households. Among the policy options, leasing of community 
forestland or producing forest products according to household needs are the most produ ctive 
and helpful alternatives in terms of both income and  employment generation. The Nepalese 
government could reduce rural poverty and unemployment related social problems if this 
makes shift from existing community forest policies into those alternative policy models. 
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Table 1 Policy Scenarios 
 
a) Base Case 
(Base Case) 
The community forest is modelled as a separate household in 
the community, maximising its income through sales of 
outputs, and with no constraints on use for firewood, fodder or 
timber. Since the community forest has no labour supp ly, it 
must employ others for production. As is common practice, 
households can purchase community forest output at a lower 
price than the market price to meet home consumption needs, 
with surplus products sold outside the local market.  
b) Leasing of Community 
Forest Land 
(Leasing) 
Similar to the base case, there are no constraints on use of 
community forest for firewood, fodder or timber, however, in 
this scenario the community forest can be leased to individual 
households. This scenario allows households with surplus 
labour to use community forests as if the land was under 
private management, effectively increasing the land available 
to a household. The community earns a rental on the area 
leased to households, and earns income from products from the 
land remaining in community management.  
c) Timber Production 
from full MAI 
(Full MAI) 
The community forest is modelled as a separate household 
similar to the Base case, but use is constrained to only annual 
timber production equal to the mean annual increment (MAI). 
By-products, including firewood produced from offcuts or 
residuals, and fodder harvested from under storey species , are 
also produced for sale.  
d) Timber Production 
from partial MAI 
(Current Policy) 
This scenario is similar to (c), however it models current 
government community forest policy which is to allow an 
annual harvest of only 30 percent of MAI for hardwoods and 
mixed deciduous forests, and  50 percent of MAI for pine 
forests. By-products can again be produced.  
e) Provision of Adequate 
Firewood 
(Firewood) 
This scenario is similar to (d) but with the constraint on 
firewood supply relaxed to allow additional firewood 
harvesting to meet household requirements.  
f) Limitations on Timber 
Production 
(No Log Market) 
This scenario is similar to (d), except that timber production is 
constrained to the level of household consump tion. This case 
applies to forest user groups in remote districts, where distance 
from markets and high transport costs limit markets for timber 
output, and to community forests in the wildlife buffer zone.  
g) No Production 
(Zero Income) 
This scenario applies to communities where the community 
forest has young age classes and is not producing timber, or 
there is a strict prohibition on any kind of use. 
Note: Short names in parentheses will be used in presentation of policy scenario results 
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Figure 1 Effect of Policies on Incomes  
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Figure 2 Income Inequality 
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Figure 3  Effect of Policies on Unemployment  
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Note: Negative signs for hired labourers (need more than household labour supply) 
 
